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v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
In 1974, The Magnavox Company (Magnavox) and North American Philips Corporation (North American) were Delaware corporations engaged in the production and marketing of a variety of related

electronic products.' On August 28 of that year, North American
Philips Development Corporation (Development), a wholly-owned
subsidiary of North American, 2 advanced a tender offer 3 of $8.00 per
share for all Magnavox common stock. 4 Development had been in' Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1351 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). Both companies manufactured electronic components
utilized in various types of consumer home entertainment products. 367 A.2d at 1351. In
addition, Magnavox was also committed to the production of a wide range of electronic
equipment for commercial industry and the United States Department of Defense. Appendix to Appellee's Brief at B20, Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Appendix to Appellee's Brief].
2 Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1351-52 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
3 Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1352 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). A tender offer is a device commonly used by one
corporation in an attempt to secure controlling interest in another. Generally, such an
offer is in the form of a public overture to the stockholders of the target corporation to
exchange their shares for a specified consideration, usually cash or securities. Note, The
Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86
HARv. L. REv. 1250, 1251 (1973). The frequent success of such solicitations results not
only from the premium rate of the consideration tendered, but also from the coercive
threat of a subsequent merger that often accompanies such an offer. Brudney, A Note on
"Going Private," 61 VA. L. REv. 1019, 1040-41 (1975). Should a shareholder fail to avail
himself of a tender offer and a merger be subsequently effected, the shareholder may
lose not only his right of equity participation, but also the opportunity to secure a premium rate of return upon divestment of his holdings. Id. For additional discussion on
the nature of tender offers, see R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION
736-48 (4th ed. 1977); Note, supra at 1254-60.
4 Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1352 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). The original offer gave notice to Magnavox shareholders that Development intended to secure all "equity interest" in their corporation.
North American Philips Development Corp. Tender Offer, September 10, 1974, at 8
[hereinafter cited as Development Tender Offer (#1)].
In an apparent attempt to pressure the shareholders into accepting the solicitation,

19781

NOTES

corporated by North American on August 21, 1974, for the express
purpose of making this tender offer. 5 The Magnavox board of directors, expressing dissatisfaction with the proposed price of the offer 6
and the unilateral manner in which it was conceived, urged shareholders to reject the proposal. 7 Subsequent negotiations, however,
produced a compromise agreeement under which the Magnavox board
retracted its opposition to the tender offer. 8 In accordance with the
offer as modified, Development obtained 14,967,429 shares of Magthe offer noted the possible consequences of Development's successful acquisition of
the desired interest in Magnavox. Potential effects included the possibilities that: (1)
Magnavox shares might be delisted by the New York Stock Exchange; (2) the market for
Magnavox stock might decline; and (3) information rights secured by the New York
Stock Exchange and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 might be forfeited. Development Tender Offer (#1) at 6.
The statement also advised of alternative actions that might be used to acquire the
entire interest in Magnavox should the original tender offer prove unsuccessful. In addition to open market purchases and tender or exchange offers, Development also stated
that it would consider "a merger, a sale or exchange of assets, liquidation or some other
transactions regarding [Magnavox]" in order to effectuate its goal. Id. at 8. With reference to such alternative actions, the statement cautioned that they "may be on terms
different from those of [the original] [o]ffer and may include the payment of more or
less cash or the exchange of securities." Id. (emphasis added). The inclusion of such
factors within a solicitation statement is a subtle form of coercion that is commonly used
to induce the sale of stock in tender offer transactions. Brudney, supra note 3, at 1041.
5 Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1351-52 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). No other business functions were contemplated
as it was intended that Development would serve only as a holding company for the
Magnavox stock obtained through the ensuing tender offer. 367 A.2d at 1351-52.
6 Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1352 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). At that time, Magnavox common stock had a book
value of over $11.00 per share. 367 A.2d at 1352. Actually, the tender price per share
exceeded the existing market price for Magnavox stock. On August 28, 1974, the last
trading day before the offer was announced, the closing market valuation for Magnavox
stock on the New York Stock Exchange was $6/s per share. North American Philips
Development Corp. Tender Offer, September 17, 1974, at 5 [hereinafter cited as Development Tender Offer (#2)]. After the announcement of the offer the market price
fluctuated between $77/s and $8% per share. See id.
7 Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d at 1352 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). The terms of the offer were proposed solely by North
American personnel. Magnavox management was not consulted at any time prior to the
actual offer. 367 A.2d at 1352.
Magnavox shareholders were informed of this opposition in a letter issued by the
Board of Directors on August 30, 1974. The letter also advised shareholders to "defer
hasty actions which would foreclose the possibility of tendering their shares at a more
favorable price." Letter from R.H. Platt to Magnavox stockholders (Aug. 30, 1974).
s Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1352 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). The offer, as modified, raised the tender price to
$9.00 per share. Development Tender Offer (#2), supra note 6, at 1. Additional terms
required Magnavox to extend two-year employment contracts to 16 of its officers, some
of whom were later named as defendants in the case. Id. at 1, 6.
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navox stock, representing nearly 84.1% of all outstanding shares. 9
Upon completion of the tender offer transaction, Development,
with the cooperation of the Magnavox board, undertook actions preparatory to effecting a merger of Magnavox and T.M.C. Development
Corporation, a subsidiary corporation completely owned and controlled
by Development. 10 Despite apparent conflicts of interest,"' the proposed merger was unanimously approved by the Magnavox board of
directors. 12 On June 27, 1975, Magnavox shareholders were sent
"notice of a special meeting" concerning the merger, and a proxy
statement dealing with various aspects of the transaction. 1 3 The
merger was approved at a special shareholders meeting held on July
24, 1975.14
Mr. and Mrs. Louis Singer, owners of Magnavox common stock
during the merger transaction, instituted suit in the Delaware Court
9 Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1352 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del, 1977). Although this was a sizeable controlling interest, it
was decidedly short of the 90% share required under Delaware statutory law for Magnavox to have effected a short form merger, i.e., one which may be consummated without shareholder approval. See DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 253 (1975 & 1976 Cum. Supp.). See
also note 13 infra.
10 Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1352 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del, 1977). Also a Delaware corporation, T.M.C. Development
was created through Development on May 8, 1975 "for the sole purpose of merger with
and into Magnavox." 367 A.2d at 1352.
11 See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1353 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). Four of the nine members of the Magnavox
board were also engaged as directors of North American. Three others had received
employment contracts pursuant to the terms of the tender offer, in addition to stock
options in North American contingent upon completion of the merger. 367 A.2d at 1353.
As a result, at the time of the merger "Magnavox was controlled by directors who were
controlled by Development and North American." Id. It should be noted that such inducements are ordinarily sufficient to dispel the presumption of good faith normally afforded the decisions of corporate directors. See note 50 infra.
12 Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1353 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
13 Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1352 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). In regard to the key considerations of the proposed
merger the proxy statement advised that: (1) Development's 84.1 percent ownership of
Magnavox would assure the majority approval required by statute. See Appendix to Appellee's Brief, supra note 1, at B7. See also DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251 (1975 & 1976 Cum.
Supp.). (2) Upon execution of the merger public shareholders would receive $9.00 for
their individual shares, the receipt of which would effectively divest them of all interest
in Magnavox, Appendix, supra at B8; (3) the book value of Magnavox common stock was
$10.16 on March 13, 1975, id.; (4) minority shareholders dissatisfied with merger options
could seek relief under the appraisal provisions of DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 262 (1975 & 1976
Cum. Supp.). Appendix, supra at B10-11. For a discussion of appraisal rights see note
74-79 infra.
14 Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1353 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
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of Chancery' 5 as individual plaintiffs and as representatives of a class
of similarly situated shareholders. 16 It was alleged in the complaint
that the merger was fraudulent because it served no purpose other
than the exclusion of the minority class 17 and that the defendants had
breached their fiduciary duty18 to the minority shareholders by agreeing to a merger price that was grossly inadequate.1 9 The relief sought
in the action was the rescission and nullification of all merger related
transactions or, in the alternative, compensatory damages for losses
incurred as a result of such transactions. 2 0 The defendants responded
with a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that it failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted since all aspects of
the merger were in conformity with applicable Delaware statutory
law. 21
15Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1349 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
16 Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d at 1351 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). The plaintiffs claimed to represent all persons who held
such shares on the day before the merger. 367 A.2d at 1351. Magnavox, North American
Philips Corporation and certain management personnel of the Magnavox Company were
named as defendants in the suit. Id. at 1350-53.
17 Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1353 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). The plaintiffs contended that no business purpose
was advanced by the transaction as the merger served only to transfer the entire equity
interest in Magnavox to North American through the forcible elimination of the minority
class of public shareholders. 367 A.2d at 1353.
18 Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1353, 1361-62 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). For a discussion of the fiduciary obligation
owed by directors and majority shareholders to minority shareholders, see notes 43-44
infra and accompanying text.
19Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1353 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). An additional allegation in the complaint asserted that
the proxy procedure utilized in effectuating the merger was misleading and thus violative of the Delaware Securities Act, DEL. CODE tit. 6 § 7303 (1975). 367 A.2d at 1353.
This claim was dismissed by the court of chancery, id. at 1361, which dismissal was
subsequently affirmed by the Delaware supreme court, Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380
A.2d 969, 982 (Del. 1977).
20 Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d at 1353 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
21 Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1351, 1353 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). The defendants contended that the merger
transaction was sanctioned by and in accordance with the provisions of DEL. CODE tit. 8
§ 251 (1975 & 1976 Cum. Supp.). 367 A.2d at 1353. Section 251(a) expressly recognizes
that "[a]ny 2 or more corporations existing under the laws of [Delaware] may merge
into a single corporation ...." DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 251(a) (1975). The defendants asserted that the cash conversion of minority shares was authorized by the statutory allowance "for the payment of cash in lieu of the issuance or recognition of fractional shares,
interests or rights" in the corporation surviving or resulting from the merger. DEL.
CODE tit. 8 § 251(b)(5)(1975 & 1976 Cum. Supp.). In response to the alleged inadequacy
of the conversion price, the defendants asserted that the exclusive recourse for those
dissatisfied with the offered consideration was to seek judicial appraisal under DEL.
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The court of chancery granted the motion to dismiss, holding
that the allegation of lack of business purpose was an insufficient
ground for finding the merger fraudulent.2 2 With regard to the allegation as to the inadequacy of merger price, the court declared that
statutory appraisal was the sole relief available to dissenting shareholders and that an action for fiduciary breach was inappropriate
where the only issue in dispute between the parties was the fairness of
the offered price. 23 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware, in
Singer v. Magnavox Co., 2 4 reversed the vice chancellor's holdings
with respect to the purpose of the merger and the attendant claim for
relief.2 5 In the opinion of the court, a long form merger pursuant to
section 251 of the Delaware Code, with "the sole purpose of freezing
out minority stockholders," constituted an exploitation of corporate
26
control and an actionable breach of fiduciary duty.
Corporate mergers effected solely for the purpose of freezing
out 2 7 minority shareholders have frequently been the subject of judiCODE tit. 8 § 262 (1975 & 1976 Cum. Supp.). See 367 A.2d at 1361-62. This section provides that stockholders who have not voted in favor of or consented to the proposedmerger may demand that the court of chancery render an appraisal of their shares, "determining their fair value exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger." DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 262(b)(1),(c),(f).
22 Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1358, 1362 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). Although the court admitted that the situation
was "fundamentally inequitable," it found that, under existing legal principles, there
was no basis for judicial inquiry into the motivation for the corporate merger. 367 A.2d
at 1358. In rejecting the "no valid business purpose" argument advanced by the plaintiffs, the court distinguished the cited supportive authorities, noting that none of those
cases had dealt with merger transactions. 367 A.2d at 1354. The court also dismissed as
inapplicable the then current developments in the regulation of corporate fraud under
rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 367 A.2d at 1357-58; cf. Santa
Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (absence of misrepresentation or nondisclosure breach of fiduciary duty does not constitute violation of anti-fraud provisions of
SEC rule lOb-5). See also Note, 8 SETON HALL L. REv. 762 (1977); Note, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1917 (1976).
23 Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1361-62 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). Concerning the sufficiency of a judicial appraisal, the court held that statutory revision was an issue for the legislature and that the
court was bound by precedent holding the statute to be "an adequate remedy." 367
A.2d at 1362.
24 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
25 id. at 980, 982.
2 Id. at 980. Recognizing the established fiduciary duty owed by majority shareholders and directors to minority shareholders, the court held that it would scrutinize
merger transactions in light of a standard of " 'entire fairness' ". under the circumstances. Id. Accordingly, the court stated that statutory compliance and evidence of a
valid business purpose would not necessarily insulate a merger transaction from judicial
review. Id.
27 In general terms, a "freeze out" is the employment of corporate control to force
elimination of a minority stockholder interest in a corporation. See 2 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE
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cial concern under Delaware law.2 s Though traditionally reluctant to
review the motivation behind corporate transactions, 29 Delaware
courts have long viewed freeze out actions with suspicion. 30 Initially,
this judicial skepticism was a vestige of the common law view that
each shareholder possessed a vested interest in the corporate entity
and that changes in its organization could be effected, therefore, only
with unanimous shareholder approval. 3 1 Although the common law
concept of vested shareholder rights has been generally superseded
by modern statutory enactments allowing greater flexibility in corporate operations, 3 2 certain equitable considerations remain significant
CORPORATIONS § 807 (1958); Note, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 1630, 1630 (1961). One authority has qualified such a displacement of the minority
interest by viewing it as "a liquidation . .. not incident to some other wholesome business goal." Vorenburg, Exclusivness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right,
77 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1192-93 (1964).

It should be recognized that freeze outs may also be accomplished by means other
than statutory merger. Techniques commonly utilized include the sale of assets, dissolution and reverse stock splits. For further discussion of these and other freeze out devices see generally F. O'NEAL, "SQUEEZE-OUTS"

OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (1975);

Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 987 (1974).
28 See, e.g., Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup.
Ct. 1952); Pennsylvania Mut. Fund, Inc. v. Todhunter Int'l, Inc., Civ. Action No. 4845,
letter opinion (Del. Ch. Aug. 5, 1975); David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc.,
281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971); MacFarlane v. North American Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch.
172, 157 A. 396 (Ch. 1928).
29 See, e.g., Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 243-45, 2 A.2d 904, 908-09 (Sup.
Ct. 1938); Havender v. Federal United Corp., 23 Del. Ch. 104, 2 A.2d 143 (Ch. 1938),
aff'd on rehearing, 24 Del. Ch. 96, 103-04, 6 A.2d 618, 622 (Ch. 1939), rev'd on other
grounds, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Gans v. Delaware Terminal
Corp., 23 Del. Ch. 69, 75, 2 A.2d 154, 156 (Ch. 1938). According to Professor Folk, this
reluctance may be a reflection of judicial deference to legislative endorsement of authorized mergers and the beneficial impact they may have upon the business community. E.

FOLK, THE DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW: A COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 332

(1972); see Bruce v. E.L. Bruce Co., 40 Del. Ch. 80, 82, 174 A.2d 29, 30 (Ch. 1961);
MacCrone v. American Capital Corp., 51 F. Supp. 462, 466 (D. Del. 1943).
30 See, e.g., Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 56, 156 A. 183, 187
(Ch. 1931); MacFarlane v. North American Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 172, 178-79, 157
A. 396, 398-99 (Ch. 1928); Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of America,
14 Del. Ch. 1, 13-14, 120 A. 486, 491-92 (Ch.), preliminary injunction dissolved, 14
Del. Ch. 64, 122 A. 142 (Ch. 1923).
31 See Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941); Reynolds
Metals Co. v. Colonial Realty Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 183, 188-89, 190 A.2d 752, 755 (Sup.
Ct. 1963); Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel.& Tube Co. of America, 14 Del. Ch. 1, 11,
120 A. 486, 489-90 (Ch.), preliminary injunction dissolved, 14 Del. Ch. 64, 122 A. 142
(Ch. 1923).
32 See Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker,
72 YALE L.J. 223, 228-29 (1962). Removal of minority interest has been sanctioned by
the legislative enactment of long form and short form merger statutes. E.g., DEL. CODE
tit. 8 §§ 251, 253 (1975 & 1976 Cum. Supp.). State legislatures, through the enactment of
corporate statutes limiting voting procedures, authorizing cash payment for shares, and
restricting the relief available to dissenters to statutory appraisal, have substantially ab-
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in judicial evaluations of attempts by majority shareholders to freeze
out minority interests.3 3 For example, in the 1929 case of Allaun v.
Consolidated Oil Co., 34 a Delaware chancery court examined a sale of
corporate assets that effectively displaced the minority investors. 35 Although the chancellor upheld the legality of the sale, 3 6 he strongly
suggested that absent a valid business purpose a similar action would
be restrained in equity, "regardless of the fairness of price." 3 7 Allaun
rogated the common law rights of minority shareholders. See Brudney, supra note 3, at
1022 n.12; Lattin, Minority and Dissenting Shareholder's Rights in Fundamental
Changes, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 307, 308-10 (1958). Such statutes have been interpreted by some as being an expression of legislative mandate that mergers be to
some "extent . . . encouraged and favored." MacFarlane v. North American Cement Co.,
16 Del. Ch. 172, 178, 157 A. 396, 398 (Ch. 1928). A more acerbic view, however, was
advanced by one court which suggested that "the very purpose of the [short form
merger] statute is to provide the parent corporation with a means of eliminating the
minority shareholder's interest in the enterprise." Stauffer v. Standard Brands Inc., 41
Del. Ch. 7, 10-11, 187 A.2d 78, 80 (Sup. Ct. 1962). In light of such attitudes, the once
"vested rights" of a minority shareholder "are now 'fixed' only in the sense that they
continue until changed by the vote of a specified majority in a manner provided by
statute." Gibson, How Fixed are Minority Class Shareholder Rights?, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 283, 283 (1953). The broad protection afforded to corporate management
and controlling shareholders under Delaware law has been soundly criticized however,
for its treatment of minority shareholder interests. See generally Cary, Federalism and
CorporateLaw-Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
33 Under the common law, a single shareholder had the power to effectively veto
any merger involving a corporation in which he possessed an equity interest. When the
necessities of commercial expansion required the extinguishment of such power, the
shareholder was "compensated" by the grant of the right to judicial appraisal of his
holdings. Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 149, 172 A. 452, 456 (Ch. 1934).
Although statutory in nature, appraisal generally incorporates basic equitable principles
through its provision for an objective determination of the fair value of a shareholder's
interest. See notes 74-79 infra and accompanying text.
3 16 Del. Ch. 318, 147 A. 257 (Ch. 1929).
35 Id. at 322-24, 147 A. at 260. The assets of the corporation were liquidated in an
effort to satisfy outstanding credit notes. Id. at 322-23, 147 A. at 259. The plaintiff, a
minority shareholder, contended that the sale was fraudulent, id., in that the liquidation
was a self-dealing action by the majority shareholders calculated to eliminate the minority interest through the manipulation of corporate control. Id. at 323, 147 A. at 259-60.
Id. at 328-30, 147 A. at 262-63. Applying the business judgment standard, see
note 50 infra, the Chancellor declared that the plaintiffs had "fail[ed] to overcome the
presumption which exists in favor of the fairness of the price which the responsible
authorities in the selling company have determined upon." 16 Del. Ch. at 329-30, 147
A. at 263.
37 Id. at 323-24, 147 A. at 260. In considering the possibility of granting equitable
relief, the Chancellor surmised that
if the sale is only a "freezing out" one by which the majority use their power to
sell to themselves in another guise and thereby carry on in the business without their former associates of the minority, equity would doubtless restrain it
regardless of the fairness of price.
Id. (dictum). For a discussion of business purpose in freeze out actions see notes 57-73
infra and accompanying text.
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and other early decisions revealed that the courts had not fully withdrawn the protection which had been afforded minority shareholders
38
prior to modem codification of corporate law.
In addressing litigation commenced by minority shareholders
challenging freeze out actions, the courts of Delaware have focused
primarily upon the issue of fairness 39 and the subsidiary considerations of the existence of a proper business purpose 40 and availability
of statutory appraisal. 41 These categories of inquiry have formed the
nucleus of the freeze out issue under Delaware law.
Because freeze out actions by definition involve situations where
the controlling faction stands to benefit from the exercise of corporate
power, the issue of fairness has emerged as the foremost concern in
minority challenges to such actions. 4 2 Recognizing the fiduciary duty
imposed on corporate directors 43 and controlling shareholders, 44 De38 See, e.g., Starring v, American Hair and Felt Co., 21 Del. Ch. 380, 384, 191 A.
887, 890 (Ch. 1937), aff'd per curiam, 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1937)
(questioning the equity of a stock redemption plan "when the avowed purpose is simply
to get rid of certain stockholders of a given class whose presence in the stockholding
group is undesirable to the rest"); Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 412, 190 A.
115, 125 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (shareholder's right to receive dividends accumulated during
time when law did not authorize their elimination "regarded as a vested right of property secured against destruction by the Federal and State Constitutions"); Outwater v.
Public Service Corp., 103 N.J. Eq. 461, 468, 143 A. 729, 732 (Ch. Div. 1928), aff'd per
curiam, 104 N.J. Eq. 490, 146 A. 916 (Ct. Err. & App. 1929) (freeze out merger enjoined
as "unwarranted and oppressive" infringement upon the reserved rights of the minority
shareholders).
39 See, e.g., Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup.
Ct. 1952); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 231, 83 A.2d 595, rev'd, 33 Del.
Ch. 82, 90 A.2d 660 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 32
A.2d 148 (Ch. 1943); Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 A. 183
(Ch. 1931).
40 See, e.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Bennett
v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 236 (Ch. 1953); MacFarlane v. North
American Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 172, 157 A. 396 (Ch. 1928).
41 See, e.g., David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus. Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Ch. 1971);
Stauffer v. Standard Brands Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Federal
United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
42 E. FOLK, supra note 29 at 333. In the opinion of Professor Folk, fairness is "[t]he
chief issue considered by the Delaware courts" in evaluating merger transactions for
possible oppression of the minority interest. Id. See also Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel
Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n,
18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 A. 183 (Ch. 1931); MacFarlane v. North American Cement Corp., 16
Del. Ch. 172, 157 A. 396 (Ch. 1928).
43 See Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 243-44, 2 A.2d 904, 908 (Sup. Ct.
1938); Lofland v. Cahall, 13 Del. Ch. 384, 389, 118 A. 1, 3 (Sup. Ct. 1922); Bowen v.
Imperial Theatres, 13 Del. Ch. 120, 128, 115 A. 918, 922 (Ch. 1922).
In regard to this fiduciary obligation the courts of Delaware have long required that
[c]orporate officers and directors . . . not . . . use their position of trust and

confidence to further their private interests. While technically not trustees, they
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laware courts have traditionally couched their analysis of freeze out
transactions in terms of fairness to the minority interest. 45 The application of this standard was perhaps best expressed in 1952 by the
Delaware supreme court in Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.46 The
litigation in Sterling arose when minority shareholders in the Mayflower Hotel Corporation challenged the proposed consolidation of
Mayflower with the Hilton Hotels Corporation. 47 Under the terms of
the merger agreement, the Mayflower shareholders were to remit
their holdings on a share-for-share basis in exchange for stock in the
surviving Hilton enterprise. 48 Principally, the plaintiffs objected to
stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders. A public
policy . . . has established a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director,
peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his duty, not
only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation committed to his
charge, but also to refrain from doing anything work that would work injury to
the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and ability
might properly bring to it ....
The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between
duty and self-interest.
Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
"See David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 434-35 (Del. Ch.
1968); Marks v. Wolfson, 41 Del. Ch. 115, 123-24, 188 A.2d 680, 685 (Ch. 1963); Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 6, 12, 99 A.2d 236, 239 (Ch. 1953).
"Control" as used in this context describes those situations where a single
shareholder, or collection of shareholders, possess or can marshall enough votes to
effectively dictate the direction of corporate policy. See 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 27, at §
1.02. Addressing such a situation, a Delaware chancery court stated that
[o]rdinarily the directors speak for and determine the policy of the corporation.
When the majority of stockholders do this, they are, for the moment, the corporation. Unless the majority in such cases are to be regarded as owing a duty to
the minority such as is owed by the directors to all, then the minority are in a
situation that exposes them to the grossest frauds and subjects them to most
outrageous wrongs.
Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of America, 14 Del. Ch. 1, 12-13, 120
A. 486, 491 (Ch. 1923). See also Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47,
58-59, 156 A. 183, 188 (Ch. 1931).
45 See, e.g., David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 430 ("fairness
is the established criterion for judicial review of interested merger transactions");
Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 134, 32 A.2d 148, 151 (Ch. 1943) (all
aspects of merger must be examined to determine fairness); Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 57, 156 A. 183, 187 (Ch. 1931) (court will enjoin merger if it
"'works a manifest wrong to the" minority); MacFarlane v. North American Cement
Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 172, 180, 157 A. 396, 400 (Ch. 1928) (court should intercede if merger
is "grossly unfair" to minority); Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of
America, 14 Del. Ch. 1, 12-13, 120 A. 486, 491 (Ch. 1923) (majority stockholders may
not commit "outrageous wrongs" against the minority through merger transactions).
"33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
47 Id. at 296-98, 93 A.2d at 108-09.
4Id.
at 297, 93 A.2d at 109.
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the exchange ratio, alleging disparity in the valuation of the two se9
curities. 4
In reviewing the transaction, the Sterling court declared that the
interested parties to a merger must sustain "the burden of establishing [the] entire fairness" of the transaction. 50 Although similar fairness standards had been used previously, 5 1 the Sterling decision was
significant for its delineation of the scope of judicial inquiry.5 2 Em49 Id.
5 Id. at 298, 93 A.2d at 109-10. Delaware generally applies a business judgment
standard to corporate transactions based upon the presumption that any decision made
by the board of directors or controlling shareholder faction "is formed in good faith and
inspired by a bona fides of purpose." Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch.
47, 58, 156 A. 183, 188 (Ch. 1931); see Bulbulia & Pinto, Statutory Responses to Interested Directors' Transactions:A Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards?, 53 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 201, 217 (1977). In reference to judicial examinations of such transactions
the Delaware supreme court has stated that
we find ourselves in the twilight zone where reasonable businessmen, fully
informed, might differ. We think, therefore, we are precluded from substituting
our uninformed opinion for that of experienced business managers of a corporation who have no personal interest in the outcome [of the proposed corporate
action].
Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 165-66, 160 A.2d 731, 738-39 (Sup. Ct. 1960); see
Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 504, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Allaun v.
Consolidated Oil Co., 16 Del. Ch. 318, 325, 147 A. 257, 261 (Ch. 1929); Allied Chemical
& Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of America, 14 Del. Ch. 64, 73, 122 A. 142, 146 (Ch.
1923), dissolving preliminary injunction granted in 14 Del. Ch. 1, 120 A. 486 (Ch.); cf.
Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 133, 32 A.2d 148, 151 (Ch. 1943) (minority stockholders who charge fraud must sustain burden of "clearly demonstrat[ing]"
that the transaction "emanate[d] from acts of bad faith").
This presumption of good faith and disinterest may be rebutted however, and the
scrutiny of the courts invoked upon an affirmative showing of
"fraud, actual or constructive, such as improper motive or personal gain or arbitrary action or conscious disregard of the interests of the corporation and the
rights of its stockholders,"

, . . or "bad faith in the transaction,"

or . . . the

transaction [being] "so manifestly unfair as to indicate fraud," or ... "'gross
and palpable overreaching.' "
E. FOLK, supra note 29, at 76 (footnotes omitted). See also note 134 infra.
At the time of the merger agreement in Sterling, Hilton held the controlling equity
interest in Mayflower and exerted substantial influence on the Mayflower board of directors. 33 Del. Ch. at 296-98, 93 A.2d at 108-09. Acknowledging this parent-subsidiary
relationship and the apparent conflict of fiduciary duties, the defendant corporation and
its interested directors conceded that their actions were no longer insulated from judicial review by the business judgment rule. Id. at 298, 93 A.2d at 109-10.
51E.g., Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 133-34, 32 A.2d 148, 151 (Ch.
1943); Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 56-58, 156 A. 183, 187 (Ch.
1931); MacFarlane v. North American Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 172 , 178-79, 157 A.
396, 398-99 (Ch. 1929).
52 See 33 Del. Ch. at 298, 304-07, 93 A.2d at 110, 113-14. The court directed its
discussion to evaluating the fairness of the conversion ratio of the stock exchange between the parent and subsidiary corporations, despite the availability of appraisal relief.
Id.
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phasizing the value of the compensation received by the minority, 53
the court evaluated the adequacy of that consideration using an equitable standard of fairness under the circumstances. 54 The court
rejected the contention that the procedure for determining the propriety of the merger was necessarily limited to a single method of valuation. 55 Instead, it declared that all pertinent terms and factors must
be scrutinized in order " '[tlo arrive at a judgment of the fairness of
the merger.' "56
Judicial inquiries relative to the fairness of freeze out mergers
have repeatedly attempted to integrate the elusive notion of business
purpose. 57 This concept is of particular significance in light of modern
53 Id. at 298-301, 93 A.2d at 110-11. The task of determining the comparative values
of the stocks constituted the central consideration in the court's resolution of the fairness issue. Id. at 305, 93 A.2d at 114.
54 Id. at 305-07, 93 A.2d at 114.
55 Id. at 304-05, 93 A.2d at 113-14. The plaintiffs attempted to characterize the consolidation as a liquidation of Mayflower's assets for the benefit of the interested
fiduciaries. Id. at 301, 93 A.2d at 111. They contended that the disparity in the comparative valuation of the assets surrendered to Hilton and stock received in return evinced
the fraudulent nature of the transaction. Id. In refusing to accept this proposition, the
court illustrated the essential distinction between a merger and a sale of assets. The
court stated that
[a] merger ordinarily contemplates the continuance of the enterprise and of the
stockholder's investment therein, though in altered form; a sale of all assets ...
ordinarily contemplates the liquidation of the enterprise. In the first case the
stockholder of the merged corporation is entitled to receive directly securities
substantially equal in value to those he held before the merger; in the latter
case he receives nothing directly but his corporation is entitled to receive the
value of the assets sold.
Id. at 303, 93 A.2d at 112.
In the opinion of the court the transaction was clearly a merger, an exchange of
stock between two going concerns. See id. at 303-05, 93 A.2d at 112-13. Consequently,
the scope of the inquiry into the fairness of that exchange could not be limited to an
analysis of liquidation value. A broader scope of inquiry was required, "all relevant
factors [concerning the merger action] must be considered." Id. at 305, 93 A.2d at 114.
5 Id. In making this statement the court cited Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del.
Ch. 127, 134, 32 A.2d 148, 151 (Ch. 1943). In Porges, a Delaware Court of Chancery
reviewed the substantive fairness of merger terms which operated to transfer the power
of corporate control from one equity class to another. Id. The court declared that the
realm of inquiry should not be restricted to an examination of the changes in the relative valuations of the classes of stock. The court viewed factors of control such as voting
rights, pre-emptive rights and the conversion of the equity classes, as significant aspects
of the merger warranting consideration in any determination of the transactions's fairness. See id.
57 See, e.g., Tanzer v. International General Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977);
Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 380
A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Pennsylvania Mut. Fund, Inc., v. Todhunter Int'l, Inc., Civ. Action No. 4845, letter opinion (Del. Ch. Aug. 5, 1975); Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27
Del. Ch. 127, 32 A.2d 148 (Ch. 1943); MacFarlane v. North American Cement Corp., 16
Del. Ch. 172, 157 A. 396 (Ch. 1929). See also Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., Inc., 490
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legislation which permits corporate mergers without requiring an affirmative showing of any business necessity for effecting such a consolidation. 58 In this regard, the courts of Delaware have often been
confronted with the question of whether compliance with the mandate of the relevant statute should insulate a merger transaction lacking a valid business purpose from judicial review of its fairness to the
minority interest.5 9 For example, in MacFarlane v. North American
Cement Corp.,60 the court of chancery investigated charges that a
stock allocation scheme, initiated pursuant to a corporate merger, discriminated between the stockholder classes. 6 1 Evaluating the transacF.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974); Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin
& Jenrette, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla. 1974), aff'd, 521 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975)
(applying Delaware law).
58 See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 253 (1975 & 1976 Cum. Supp.). The short form
merger under Delaware law was designed as a vehicle through which a parent corporation possessing a 90 percent equity interest in a subsidiary could employ a merger to
effectively expel the minority stockholders in the subsidiary from the enterprise upon
the tender of cash or securities for the minority's equity holdings. Balotti, The Elimination of the Minority Interests by Mergers Pursuant to Section 251 of the General Corporation Law of Delaware, 1 DEL. J. OF CORP. LAw 63, 65 (1977). In reviewing a
section 253 merger, one Delaware court declared that "the very purpose of [section 253
is to provide the parent corporation with a means of eliminating the minority shareholder's interest in the enterprise." Stauffer v. Standard Brands Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 10-11,
197A.2d 78, 80 (Sup. Ct. 1962). See also Application of Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del.
Ch. 406, 412, 213 A.2d 203, 208-09 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Braasch v. Goldschmidt, 41 Del.
Ch. 519, 524-25, 199 A.2d 760, 764 (Ch. 1964).
59See, e.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 503-04, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Sup. Ct.
1964); Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 21-22, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Sup. Ct. 1962);
Starring v. American Hair & Felt Co., 21 Del. Ch. 380, 384, 191 A. 887, 890 (Ch. 1937),
aff'd per curiam, 21 Del. Ch. 431, 2 A.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Potter v. Sanitary Co. of
America, 22 Del. Ch. 110, 115-117, 194 A. 87, 89 (Ch. 1937); Allaun v. Consolidated Oil
Co., 16 Del. Ch. 318, 325, 147 A. 257, 261 (Ch. 1929).
Professor Lattin is of the opinion that judicial examinations of the underlying purposes of corporate transactions are motivated by a desire to protect the equity position
of the minority. Lattin, Equitable Limitations on Statutory Charter Powers Given to
Majority Shareholders, 30 MICH. L. REV. 645, 646 (1932). Fundamental to this view is
the proposition that the majority or controlling security holders occupy a
fiduciary relationship to the remainder . . . . So long as the controlling group
has the interest of the whole at heart, seeking to make the venture the greatest
success possible for the fused mass, whether it be through a sale of all the
corporation's assets, a merger or . . . change in fundamental powers, . . . the

propriety of the act is incontestable. However, as soon as the controlling interest favors itself or some other group it . . .fails to act for the best interests of
the mass. At this point, . . . we may infer that the fiduciary duty is violated.
Id. at 648-649 (footnote omitted). See also Note, supra note 27, at 1646.
60 16 Del. Ch. 172, 157 A. 396 (Ch. 1928).
61 Id. at 172-77, 157 A. at 396-98. The action in MacFarlane centered upon the
consolidation of two Delaware corporations, the North American Cement Corporation
(North American) and the Pennsylvania-Dixie Cement Corporation. See id. at 173, 157
A. at 396. Under the merger plan, the outstanding stock of North American was to be
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tion, 6 2 the court held that considerations of fairness would require the
enjoining of the merger if it were determined that "its real and only
purpose [was] to promote the interests of one class of stockholders to
the detriment, or . . .expense of another .. .even though the latter

[was] in the decided minority." 63 Although the court failed to find
such motivation, 64 the Chief Justice went on to suggest that it would
not be beyond the equitable power of the court to prevent such a
consolidation where a plausible business purpose was conspicuously
65
absent and there was an affirmative showing of fraud.
The business purpose approach utilized in MacFarlane was reiterated in 1953 by the court of chancery in Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp. 6 6 The dispute in Bennett centered upon an attempt by
a minority shareholder to block a stock issue plan advanced by the
controlling majority stockholder. 6 7 The plaintiff alleged that the reorreclassified as common stock in the consolidated enterprise. Id. at 176-77, 157 A. at 398.
This reclassification was to be effected on an exchange ratio of two shares of North
American preferred for one share of common stock in the newly formed company. The
common stockholders of North American were to receive two shares in the consolidated
corporation in exchange for each of their shares. Id. at 175-77, 157 A. at 397-98. The
reclassification scheme was challenged by the plaintiffs, North American's preferred
stockholders, who alleged that the terms of the stock allocation plan were "grossly unfair and fraudulent," in regard to the respective valuations of the equity classes of North
American. Id. at 172-77, 157 A. at 396-98.
62 Id. at 178-83, 157 A. at 398-400. The court prefaced its discussion of the contested transaction by emphasizing the legislative endorsement of corporate mergers
under Delaware law. Id. at 178, 157 A. at 398. See also note 26 supra and accompanying
text. In the opinion of the Chief Justice, this approval, coupled with the protections
afforded by the good faith presumptions of the business judgment rule, weighed heavily
in favor of the validity of such transactions. See 16 Del. Ch. at 178, 157 A. at 398. See
also note 45 supra and accompanying text. Accordingly, the court suggested that a
merger should fail as fraudulent only upon a showing that it was "grossly unfair" to
minority shareholders. 16 Del. Ch. at 178, 157 A. at 398.
63 16 Del. Ch. at 178, 157 A. at 398.
64 Id. at 181-82, 157 A. at 400. The central consideration in regard to the purpose of
the merger in MacFarlane was the benefit of the transaction to the overall corporate
entity. The court acknowledged that the benefits of the consolidation were not equally
apportioned between the equity classes. It declared, however, that the discrepancy was
not of such magnitude as to justify the injunction of an action "which would be advantageous for the stockholders as a whole." Id. at 182, 157 A. at 400.
65 See id.
66 34 Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 236 (Ch. 1953).
67 Id. at 8, 99 A.2d at 237. The plaintiff held a substantial, but distinctly minority,
equity interest in the Breuil Petroleum Corporation. The stock issue to which he advanced his challenge was a financial reorganization arrangement proposed by the majority stockholders. Under the terms 6f the plan the par value of the corporation's stock
was to be reduced by 60% in conjunction with an increase in the number of total shares
outstanding. Though subject to certain restrictions, shareholders of record were entitled
to maintain their level of investment through pro rata subscriptions in the new market
issues. Id. at 11, 99 A.2d at 238-39.
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ganization scheme was designed to freeze out the minority interest
through the issuance of stock at a "grossly inadequate" price. 6s The
chancellor prefaced his review of these allegations by noting "that
action by majority stockholders having as its primary purpose the
'freezing out' of a minority interest is actionable without regard to the
fairness of the price." 69 From this premise, the court proceeded to
examine the possible motives for the stock issue and the relative fairness of the proposed consideration. 70 The court was reluctant to insulate the transaction from judicial review through application of the
business judgment rule 7 ' because there existed "a substantial factual
dispute as to the legal propriety of the motives of the corporate defendant and its controlling stockholder." 72 In denying the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, the court stated that questions concerning the nature of the defendants' interest and the purpose of the
contested action were matters requiring judicial determination on the
73
merits.
Another consideration which has weighed heavily in judicial decisions as to the fairness of freeze out mergers attempted under Delaware law is the availability of appraisal relief. 74 A creature of statute, 75 appraisal is clearly a reflection of the legislative endorsement of
68 Id. at 8, 10-12, 99 A.2d at 237, 238-39. Had the plaintiff failed to exercise his
option to increase his holdings on a pro rata basis, his equity in the corporation would
have been greatly diminished. Because of the substantial difference between the par
values of the outstanding stock and the new issue, additional market subscriptions to the
corporation would work only to debilitate the value of the plaintiff's existing equity
interest. Id. at 14, 99 A.2d at 240.
69 Id. at 12, 99 A.2d at 239.
70 Id. at 12-15, 99 A.2d at 239-41.
71 See note 50 supra.
72 34 Del. Ch. at 12, 99 A.2d at 239. Significant questions as to the interest and
motives of the defendants in the management of corporate assets were raised in the
pleadings and by affidavits filed with the court. See id. at 12-15, 99 A.2d at 239-41.
73 Id. at 12-13, 16, 99 A.2d at 239-40, 242.
74 See E. FOLK, supra note 29, at 395-97. In an attempt to prevent the potential
abuse engendered by the legislative authorization of corporate mergers, a majority of the
states have enacted appraisal statutes designed to afford those shareholders objecting to
a merger an opportunity to receive the fair value of their holdings. See F. O'NEAL,
supra note 24, at § 5.27. Under such statutes, corporations are generally required to
purchase, at a judicially determined value, the shares of those stockholders who dissent
from a contemplated merger or consolidation action. Vorenburg, supra note 27, at
1189-92; Recent Developments in the Law of CorporateFreeze-outs, 14 B.C. INDUS. &
COMM. L. REV. 1252, 1255-56 (1973).
75 See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 262 (1975 & 1976 Cum. Supp.). In general terms, the
Delaware appraisal statute provides that upon receiving formal notice of consolidation
or merger, dissenting shareholders have 20 days within which to present to the corporation a written demand of payment for the stock in their possession. Id. § 262(a), (b). If a
dispute subsequently arises in regard to the value of the stock, the shareholder may
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corporate mergers. 76 Shareholders objecting to a consolidation are,
"[a]s a general proposition," obliged to elect between acceptance of the
organic change and judicial appraisal of their holdings. 77 Although statutory mergers are vulnerable in equity upon a showing of fraud, 78
modem case law reveals that it has become increasingly difficult for
dissenting shareholders to sustain the burden of such a demonstra79
tion.
Depending upon the nature of the transaction and issues in controversy, some Delaware courts have refused to consider the substantive fairness of certain merger actions. Such a refusal was explicitly
made by the Delaware supreme court in Stauffer v. Standard
Brands, Inc. 80 Examining a short form merger action, 8 1 the Stauffer
request that the issue be submitted to a judicially appointed appraiser who shall render
an objective decree of value. Id. § 262(c),(d),(e).
71See note 74 supra. Appraisal relief was initially intended to serve as a "safety
value" for minority shareholders in the event of control exploitation by the majority
class. 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1030, 1037 n.13 (1958). See also note 74 supra. This protection
has become increasingly significant in view of the enactment of modern short form
merger statutes which expressly limit the relief available to dissenting shareholders to
such judicial appraisal. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 253 (1975 & 1976 Cum. Supp.).
77 Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 56, 156 A. 183, 187 (Ch.
1931).
78 Id. In reference to those situations in which a dissenting shareholder may not be
obligated to make the statutory appraisal election, the courts have recognized that "[t]he
exercise of the statutory right of merger is always subject to nullification for fraud." Id.
79
See, e.g., Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Sup. Ct.
1962); David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1968). The
broad language and legislative endorsement of statutory merger provisions invited liberal interpretations by the courts which, in turn, effectively restrained dissenting
shareholders in their pursuit of equitable relief. In a holding that typified the response
of the Delaware judiciary, the court, in MacCrone v. American Capital Corp., 51 F.
Supp. 462 (D. Del. 1943), declared that when
the required statutory majorities have the right to merge two or more corporations, there is a presumption of bona fides of purpose with a resultant burden
on dissidents to demonstrate that the terms of the merger are so unfair as to
amount to constructive fraud.
Id. at 466 (footnote omitted).
Other courts have saddled dissenters with a heavier burden which required "the
unfairness [to] be of such character and . . . so clearly demonstrated as to impel the
conclusion that it emanates from acts of bad faith or a reckless indifference to the rights
of others interested, rather than from an honest error of judgment." Porges v. Vadsco
Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 133, 32 A.2d 148, 151 (Ch. 1943).
This permissive attitude, which constitutes the major obstacle confronting shareholders seeking to challenge corporate mergers, has been manifest in judicial decisions
restricting dissidents to appraisal relief. See Stauffer, 41 Del. Ch. at 10-11, 187 A.2d
at 80; Schenley, 281 A.2d at 35-36; Bruce v. E.L. Bruce Co., 40 Del. Ch. 80, 82-83,
174 A.2d 29, 30-31 (Ch.1961).
so41 Del. Ch. 7, 197 A.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
81 Id. at 8-9, 187 A.2d at 79. In that action, Standard Brands attempted to consolidate one of its subsidiaries into the enterprise by means of a short form merger trans-
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court considered the contention that minority shareholders in a subsidiary corporation were entitled to equitable relief due to alleged
inadequacy of consideration. 8 2 In affirming the chancery court's dismissal of the action,8 3 the supreme court held that relief in equity
should not lie when the matter at issue involves only "a difference of
opinion as to value,"8 4 and that statutory appraisal was the "exclusive"
recourse of those shareholders challenging the fairness of price in
85
short form merger situations.
The permissive attitude of the Delaware courts toward appraisal
relief was demonstrated again in David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley
Industries, Inc. ,86 wherein the Delaware Court of Chancery reviewed
a long form, "interested merger" designed to eliminate the minority
shareholders of the Schenley corporation.8 7 The complaint in Schenley alleged that Alden, owner of approximately 86% of the outstanding Schenley common stock, attempted to effect a section 251, long
88
form, merger with a subsidiary corporation also owned by Alden.
Pursuant to the terms of the proposed merger, the minority
action. Id. at 9, 187 A.2d at 79. Standard Brands, possessing the 90% equity interest in
the subsidiary required by section 253 of title 8 of the Delaware Code proceeded to purchase the minority interest in the subsidiary on a cash-for-stock basis. Id.
82 Id., 187 A.2d at 80. The consideration dispute stemmed from charges that the
amount tendered for the subsidiary stock was "so grossly inadequate" that it constituted
a fraud as to the minority interest. Id.
83 Id. at 11, 187 A.2d at 80.
84 Id. at 9-11, 187 A.2d at 80. In light of the fact that there was no evidence of
unlawful conduct on the part of the defendants, the court responded to the charges of
inadequate consideration by stating "that the real relief sought [was] the recovery of the
monetary value of the plaintiff's shares-relief for which the statutory' appraisal provisions provided an adequate remedy." Id. at 9, 187 A.2d at 80.
85 Id. Addressing the issue of relief, the state supreme court agreed with the vice
chancellor's analysis of section 253 and endorsed his view that appraisal was the exclusive remedy available to the plaintiffs under the statute. 41 Del. Ch. at 9-11, 187 A.2d at
80. The court recognized that section 253 was patterned after the short form merger
statute of New York. 41 Del. Ch. at 10, 187 A.2d at 80; see Coyne v. Park & Tilford
Distillers Corp., 37 Del. Ch. 558, 564, 146 A.2d 785, 788 (Ch. 1958), aff'd, 38 Del. Ch.
514, 154 A.2d 893 (Sup. Ct. 1959). Compare DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 253 (1975 & 1976 Cui.
Supp.) with N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw 623 (McKinney 1963). Following precedent set in
New York and adopted in Delaware in Coynoe, the Stauffer court concluded that absent
a showing of "illegality or [fraudulent] overreaching," relief should be limited to judicial appraisal. 41 Del. Ch. at 10, 187 A.2d at 80; see Coyne, 38 Del. Ch. at 521-22, 154
A.2d at 897-98.
In explaining its decision not to enjoin the merger, the Stauffer court reasoned that
under its interpretation of section 253, "the very purpose of the statute is to provide the
parent corporation with a means of eliminating the minority shareholder's interest in the
enterprise." 41 Del. Ch. at 10-11, 187 A.2d at 80.
86 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971).
87

Id. at 32-33.

88 Id. at 31.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[8: 712

shareholders were to receive cash and subordinated debentures as
89
consideration for the surrender of their equity interest in Schenley.
After examining the merger terms, the vice chancellor rejected the
contention that the consideration tendered for the minority shares
was so unfair as to warrant relief in equity. 90 In refusing to enjoin the
consolidation action, 9 1 the court stated that the issue in controversy
was simply a "dispute as to value, for which an appraisal should be
adequate." 92 Relying upon the decision in Stauffer, the court concluded that where the controversy was limited to the issue of fairness
of price, the rights of minority shareholders under section 251 (long
form merger statute) were equivalent to those available under section
253 of the Delaware Code (short form merger statute). 93 Although the
court failed to cite any authority in support of this proposition, the
significance and possible ramifications of the statement were clear. By
equating the remedies available in a section 251 merger with those
afforded in a section 253 situation the court effectively sanctioned the
use of long form, "cash out" mergers where the only reason for the
transaction was the elimination of the minority equity class. Apparently, the traditional judicial inquiry as to the business purpose of
section 251 mergers between interested parties was no longer required in all cases. 9 4 The Schenley court, in declining to apply the
standard of fairness employed in Sterling9 5 to the interested merger
9 Id. at 31-32. Claiming self-dealing and inadequacy of consideration, the plaintiffs
named both Alden and Schenley as defendants in their derivative and representative
suit to enjoin the effectuation of the merger. Id.
90 Id. at 32. The plaintiffs had requested that the court grant "preliminary and permanent injunctive relief" to prevent the consummation of the contemplated consolidation. Id.
91Id. at 36. In the opinion of the court, the plaintiffs had..failed to make the requisite showing of "a reasonable probability of ... ultimate success on final hearing." Id. at
35.
92 Id. at 33. Because the central issue in controversy was the question of relative
stock valuation the court declared that appraisal was the appropriate relief
unless the fair value of Schenley stock [was] so much greater than the total
amount offered, or that [the] plaintiffs and other minority stockholders [were]
being otherwise deprived of clear rights or . . . taken advantage of by those
charged with a fiduciary duty towards them as to constitute a form of constructive fraud ....
Id.
9 281 A.2d at 35. Compare Schenley, id. (evaluating § 251 long form merger) with
Stauffer, 41 Del. Ch. at 10-11, 187 A.2d at 80 (evaluating § 253 short form merger). See
also notes 80-85 supra and accompanying text,
94See
281 A.2d at 32-33, 35; see also E. FOLK, supra note 29, at 381 n.61; Balotti,
supra note 58, at 73, 77.
95 281 A.2d at 32-33. The Schenley court distinguished Sterling as involving a dispute as to the relative value of two whole corporations. Id. In contrast, the controversy
in Schenley centered on the value of the cash and debentures tendered in exchange for
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situation, effected a substantial curtailment of the protection previously afforded to minority interests. 96 The decision in effect insulated certain interested corporate transactions from the judicial
scrutiny to which they had been subjected in the past. 9 7 Absent a
showing of "fraud or blatant overreaching,- 9 8 a shareholder challenging such an interested transaction was restricted in his pursuit of
satisfaction to the provisions of statutory appraisal. 99
The considerations of fairness, business purpose and the
availability of appraisal relief were prime factors in the Singer court's
discussion of the obligations arising between the parties to a merger
effected under section 251 of the Delaware Code. 10 0 Emphasizing the
fiduciary duty' 01 which controlling shareholders and corporate directors owe to minority shareholders, 10 2 the Singer court held that a
long form merger executed with the single intention of eliminating
the minority interest presented a cause of action for which equitable
relief might be granted. 103
Schenley stock. Id. at 33. In the opinion of the court, the principal issue thus presented
was the determination of "the fair value of the offer being made to [the] plaintiffs and
other minority stockholders of Schenley and whether or not this amount approximate[d]
the fair value of the shares of Schenley which the plan proposes to eliminate." Id. at
32-33. Having thus narrowed the issue, the Schenley court found the broad inquiry used
in Sterling inappropriate and relegated the dispute to appraisal proceedings. Id.
96 Compare id. at 35 with Sterling, 33 Del. Ch. at 298, 93 A.2d at 109-10. In reference to the rights of the minority interest, the ccurt declared that each shareholder in
Schenley was under "constructive notice" that his holdings were subject to divestment
in the event of a lawful corporate merger. 281 A.2d at 35.
97Despite the affirmative showing of "interest" in the transaction, the court refused
to examine the merger under the standards of intrinsic fairness announced in Sterling.
See 281 A.2d at 32-33. This refusal in effect extended the good faith presumption of the
business judgment rule to such interested merger actions, thus limiting the scope of
judicial inquiry relative to the propriety of the transaction. See E. FOLK, supra note 29,
at 333-36.
98 281 A.2d at 35.

9 Id. For additional discussion of statutory appraisal, see notes 74-79 supra and
accompanying text.
10 See 380 A.2d 969, 976-78 (Del. 1977).
101Id. at 972-73. The fiduciary relationship between the parties represented a crucial consideration in the Singer decision. Unlike the chancery court which dismissed
the plaintiffs' complaint for failing to make an adequate showing of fraud, the supreme
court found that a viable cause of action was presented based upon the defendants'
breach of their fiduciary obligations to the plaintiff. Id. at 975, 980.
102 Id. at 972-73. Citing the fiduciary standards long recognized under Delaware
law, the court characterized the corporate directors and majority shareholders as quasitrustees sworn " 'to protect the interest of the corporation committed to [their] charge
[and] to refrain from doing . . . injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or
advantage.' " Id. at 976-77, 980 (quoting from Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5
A.2d 503, 510 (Sup. Ct. 1939). For further discussion of fiduciary duties, see notes 43-44
supra and accompanying text.
103 380 A.2d at 980. Analogizing to the common law concept of vested shareholder
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Addressing the allegations that the Magnavox merger was fraudulent, 10 4 the court premised its review of the transaction upon the
settled proposition "that even complete compliance with the mandate
of statute" will not place an action beyond the scope of judicial
scrutiny.1 05 Guided by this principle, the court struck a balance between the statutory authorization of corporate mergers and the
fiduciary obligations owed to the minority shareholders. 10 6 The court
found that the defendants, as interested parties "standing on both
sides of the merger transaction,' 1 7 were required to sustain the burden of showing fairness of their actions with respect to the minority
interest. 10 8 In this regard, the court stated that the mere calculation
of "fair value"'1 9 afforded dissenting shareholders through judicial
appraisal alone was insufficient to satisfy the burden so imposed, because it excludes consideration of myriad, non-monetary, collateral
factors which often influence investment decisions. 110 Rejecting the
contention that appraisal was the exclusive available remedy,"' the
court recognized the need for a broader scope of inquiry to ensure
the integrity of section 251 merger transactions."' Accordingly, the
Singer court invoked the standard advanced in Sterling, stating that
such mergers were subject to judicial examination for their " 'entire
fairness' " under the circumstances. 113
rights, the court declared that "just as a minority shareholder may not thwart a merger
without cause, neither may a majority cause a merger . . . for the sole purpose of
eliminating a minority." Id. at 978.
104 Id. at 972.
105 Id. at 975. The court acknowledged that the "cash-out" terms of the Magnavox
consolidation were expressly within the statutory authorization of section 251(b)(4). Id.
at 973; See DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 251(b)(4) (1975 & 1976 Cum. Supp.). The court also
recognized that the defendants had complied with the procedural requirements of the
statute, but cautioned that such compliance would not render the transaction "legally
unassailable." See 380 A.2d at 975. See also Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d
437, 439 (Del. 1971).
106 See 380 A.2d at 978.
107 Id. at 976.
10

8 Id.

109 Id.

at 977.

110 Id. The defendant's argument that relief should be limited to appraisal under
section 262 was rejected because it failed to consider the "form" of the plaintiffs' investment and the attendant benefits of such equity holdings. See id. The court reasoned
that factors such as the tax consequences of the shareholders' displacement and the
forfeiture of future profit opportunities represented important considerations that should
not be excluded from the determination of the propriety of the relief. See id. For a
discussion of the inadequacies of appraisal relief, see Vorenburg, supra note 27, at
1201-04.
11 380 A.2d at 977.

112 See id. at 978, 980.
113 Id. at 980; see 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107, 109-10 (Sup. Ct. 1952). See

also notes 46-56 supra and accompanying text.
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The most significant aspect of the Singer court's analysis of the
Magnavox merger was its treatment of the concept of business purpose. Refusing to apply the narrower standard of scrutiny used in
Stauffer"1 4 and Schenley, 115 the Delaware supreme court rejected the
chancery court's view that lack of "business purpose" failed to constitute adequate grounds for enjoining such merger transactions under
Delaware law. 116 Employing a more expansive review based upon the
fiduciary relationship existing between the majority and minority
stockholders, the Singer court declared that it is a breach of fiduciary
duty per se to effectuate a long form merger for the sole purpose of
freezing out the minority equity interest. 11 7 The court further stated
that regardless of the business interests they purport to promote,
such consolidations must satisfy the test of entire fairness set forth in
Sterling or become vulnerable in equity to those who would advance
a challenge. " 8
Signaling a return to the standards of fairness under Delaware
corporate law, the Singer decision effectively recognized the need to
provide more comprehensive protection for minority shareholders in
long form freeze out merger situations. 11 9 This recognition was
echoed in a subsequent Delaware decision, Tanzer v. International
General Industries, Inc. 120 In Tanzer, the Delaware supreme court
examined a long form merger effected pursuant to a valid business
purpose of the majority stockholder.121 Relying heavily upon its deciDespite attempts by the court to distinguish prior law, the holding in Singer casts
serious doubt upon the continued viability of previous cases wherein dissenters from
long form merger relegated to an exclusive remedy of appraisal. 380 A.2d at 979. See
David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 280 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1968); Bruce v.
E.L. Bruce Co., 40 Del. Ch. 80, 174 A.2d 29 (Ch. 1961). Professor Folk suggests that
both Schenley and Bruce are expressly overruled by the supreme court's decision in
Singer. Folk, Holdings by State Court Grounded in Prior Law, N.Y.L.J. Dec. 19, 1977,
at 29 col. 5, 41 col. 6.
114 See notes 80-85 supra and accompanying text.
115 See notes 86-99 supra and accompanying text.
116380 A.2d at 975. In holding that Delaware law would impose a stricter standard
of regulation to " 'cash-out' ", "freeze-out" mergers, the court declared that "if it is alleged that the purpose [of the merger] is improper because of the fiduciary obligation
owed to the minority, the [courts are] duty-bound to closely examine that allegation."
Id. at 979.
117 Id. at 980.
118

Id.

119 See Folk, supra note 113, at 41 col. 6. Prior to the decision in Singer, Professor
Folk was of the opinion that under Delaware corporate law the trend was away from the
application of the standards of intrinsic fairness. E. FOLK, supra note 29, at 334-35. See
generally Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971); Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly
Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970); Chasin v. Gluck, 282 A.2d 188 (Del. Ch. 1971); David
J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971).
120 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
121 Id. at 1122-23. The Tanzer litigation resulted from an attempt by International

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[8: 712

sion in Singer, the supreme court held that where a business purpose
was clear, 122 such a merger did not constitute a per se violation of the
fiduciary duty of the controlling shareholder and, therefore, might be
permissible under Delaware law. 123 Notwithstanding this holding,
however, the Tanzer court declared that even an affirmative showing
of a "bonafide purpose" would not insulate such a merger from "judicial scrutiny for 'entire fairness' as to all aspects of the transaction."' 24 In the opinion of the court, this logical extension of the entire fairness mandate established in Sterling and reaffirmed in Singer
was required by the pervading fiduciary duty of the majority stockholders. 125
The decisions in Singer and Tanzer clearly establish that, despite
compliance with statutory procedure, interested merger transactions
will be subject to judicial scrutiny for their entire fairness under the
circumstances. It has been contended that the impact of these holdings may be substantially limited by the failure of the courts to present a clear definition of business purpose. 126 A careful reading of the
cases reveals, however, that precise standards and guidelines may be
General Industries, Inc. (IGI) to effectuate a section 251 cash-out merger between Kliklok Corporation, a subsidiary corporation in which IGI owned 81% of the common
stock, and KLK Corporation, a shell corporation formed by IGI to facilitate the consolidation. See id. at 1122. The plaintiffs, minority stockholders in Kliklok, as majority stockholder, had violated its fiduciary duty by effectively freezing out the minority interest
through a merger which served only the purposes of the parent corporation. Id. at
1122-23.
122 Id. at 1124-25. In examining the merger transaction the court declared that "the
real issue for decision center[ed] around IGI's right to cause a merger 'for a valid business reason' of its own, independent of any corporate interest of Kliklok." Id. at 1123.
As in Singer, the Tanzer court struck a balance between the relative interests of the
majority and minority stockholders. Id. Although the court acknowledged that in both
cases the principal concern was the protection of the minority interest, the court also
recognized that the majority stockholder "has a [fundamental] right to vote his shares in
his own interest, including the expectation of personal profit, limited, of course, by any
duty he owes to other stockholders." Id. at 1124; see Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey
Com. Shows v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 621-23, 53 A.2d 441, 447 (Sup. Ct. 1947). After
a review of the facts, the supreme court adopted the chancellor's view that 'the only
reason for the merger [was] to facilitate long term debt financing by IGI . . . not [the]
freezing out of the minority just for the purpose of freezing out the minority.' 379 A.2d
at 1124.
123 379 A.2d at 1124-25.
124 See id. at 1125. Although the defendant's showing of a business purpose was
sufficient to withstand the motion for preliminary injunction, the supreme court declared that such a showing "d[id] not terminate the litigation" and remanded the case
for "a fairness hearing." Id.
125

See id.

Borden, Some Comments on Singer v. Magnavox, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 4, 1977, at 1 col.
2; Borden, Delaware Speaks Out Again on Takeouts, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25, 1977, at 1 col. 1.
126
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unnecessary. 12 7 Read together, Singer and Tanzer require that any
interested merger which purports to advance a business purpose, that
is, any purpose other than a desire to expel the minority interest,
must satisfy the standard of entire fairness.1 2 8 Transactions which fall
within this framework of review, by their very nature, involve parties
whose interests are adverse. Quite often, the party invoking the
power of corporate process stands to receive a substantial benefit
from such an exercise. The "power andright" of the majority to effect
a merger transaction is not easily reconciled with the protection
which should be afforded the minority interest.' 2 9 It is from this balance that questions arise as to " '[w]hose business' " and " '[w]hose

purpose' " a consolidation action should advance. 130 Under Singer and
Tanzer, however, there appears to be no need to delineate the exact
boundaries of business purpose. 131 Singer declares that upon a
threshold showing that the merger serves some purpose other than an
arbitrary freeze out of the minority class, judicial review of the transaction will be framed in terms of entire fairness. 132 The natural corollary to this view, articulated in Tanzer, is that even an affirmative
showing of a valid business purpose will not remove a merger from
33
the realm of entire fairness.'
The decision in Singer will have a substantial and far reaching
effect upon Delaware corporate law. Indeed, Singer, in conjunction
with Tanzer, clearly presents viable guidelines for evaluating the actions of corporate fiduciaries relative to the rights and interests of
minority stockholders in freeze out mergers. More importantly, these
decisions indicate a renewed willingness on the part of the Delaware
judiciary to undertake the more rigorous inquiry of intrinsic fairness
in examining interested corporate transactions. 13 4 The expansive re127See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d at 976; Folk, supra note 119, at 41 col. 2.
128 See Tanzer, 379 A.2d at 1125; Singer, 380 A.2d at 980 & n.l; Folk, supra note
113, at 41 col. 3.
129 379 A.2d at 1123.
130 380 A.2d at 976.

131 See id.; 379 A.2d at 1123; Folk, supra note 113, at 41 col. 2-3.
132 380 A.2d at 976.
133 379 A.2d at 1124; see 380 A.2d at 980.
134 The mandate of Sterling requiring a review of the entire fairness of a transaction
upon a showing of "interest" or possible benefit to an involved corporate fiduciary was
substantially eroded by subsequent case law which effectively extended the business
judgment rule to interested corporate transactions. For example, in Getty Oil Co. v.
Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970), rev'g 255 A.2d 717 (Del. Ch. 1969), the Delaware supreme court declared that a parent corporation's dealings with a subsidiary
would be insulated by the business judgment rule absent a demonstration of " 'gross
and palpable overreaching' which would warrant judicial interference." 267 A.2d at 888.
This expansion of the presumption of validity afforded by the business judgment doc-
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view called for by the supreme court in Singer in the long form
merger context is readily adaptable to those situations wherein minority shareholders are threatened with other forms of freeze out action
by the controlling equity interest. In fact, the strict judicial scrutiny
for entire fairness mandated by Singer has been applied to a short
form merger situation, 135 despite the fact that the Stauffer holding
remains undisturbed. 136 Singer's threshold consideration of business
trine was reiterated in later decisions which held that the standard of intrinsic fairness
would be invoked "only when the [parent's] fiduciary duty [was] accompanied by selfdealing [where] the parent receive[d] something from the subsidiary to the exclusion of,
and detriment to, the minority stockholders of the subsidiary." Sinclair Oil Corp. v.
Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971), aff'g in part, rev'g in part 261 A.2d 911 (Del.
Ch. 1969). See also Chasin v. Gluck, 282 A.2d 188, 192 (Del. Ch. 1971). The cumulative
effect of these cases was to impose upon the minority stockholders the heavier burden
of establishing both interest and actual self-dealing on the part of corporate fiduciaries
to remove a transaction from the business judgment rule and secure judicial hearing
relative to the fairness of the action. See 282 A.2d at 192.
The recognition of the need for stricter scrutiny of freeze out mergers was manifest
in the Singer court's emphasis upon the obligations of corporate fiduciaries and the
safeguards necessary to prevent the exploitation of corporate power. See 380 A.2d at
979-80. In Tanzer, the court again questioned the equity of mergers effected between
interested parties. See 379 A.2d at 1124. Addressing the subject of the business judgment rule, the court noted that although the "rule has its place in . . . intracorporate
affairs, it is not the measure of a [parent corporation's] responsibility to minority
shareholders in its subsidiary . . . at least when control over corporate assets and processes for merger purposes is at issue." Id.
In both Singer and Tanzer the Delaware supreme court acknowledged that freeze
out mergers, even when accomplished to further a legitimate "business purpose," are
self-dealing transactions within the definition presented in Sinclair and therefore not
entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule. See 380 A.2d at 980; 379 A.2d
at 1124-25. See also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d at 720. In reviewing such
transactions, the court indicated a willingness to undertake a fairness inquiry based solely upon a showing of a merger and allegations of freeze out motive. See Singer, 380
A.2d at 980; Tanzer, 379 A.2d at 1124-25. Upon such a showing it then becomes incumbent upon the parent corporation to justify its action by proving that the merger is
designed to serve a valid business purpose and that it is entirely fair to all interests
involved. 380 A.2d at 980; 379 A.2d at 1124-25. See Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372,
1378-79 (Del. Ch. 1978). Thus, although the breadth of the decisions in Singer and
Tanzer in this regard remains unsettled, it does appear that these decisions do provide
an exception to the procedural barriers erected in Sinclair and Getty, at least in the
context of freeze out mergers.
135 See Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977). In granting a preliminary
injunction effectively blocking a section 253 merger, the Kemp court cited Singer and
Tanzer as evincing the recent trend of the courts of Delaware toward "defining the
fiduciary duty of majority stockholders to the minority, as being over and above statutory requirements." Id. at 245.
36
1
See notes 80-85 supra and accompanying text. Under section 253 a parent corporation may, upon board resolution, eliminate minority shareholders in a 90 percent
owned subsidiary by a tender of securities or cash for their equity interest. See DEL.
CODE tit. 8 § 253(a) (1975). Judicial evaluations of section 253 have consistently held
that such displacements were expressly contemplated by the legislative mandate. See
Application of Del. Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 412, 213 A.2d 203, 208-09 (Sup. Ct.
1965); Stauffer v. Standard Brands, 41 Del. Ch. 7, 10-11, 197 A.2d 78, 80 (Sup. Ct.
1962).
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purpose, coupled with its revival of the standards of entire fairness,
represent judicial recognition of, and opposition to, the hardships
which often result from corporate freeze outs. While the inherent
clash between majority and minority interests will continue to lend
color to intracorporate relations, the renewed judicial emphasis upon
fiduciary obligations and fairness, rising in the wake of Singer, will
work to prevent future abuse of corporate process under Delaware law.
Kevin R. Gardner
In enjoining the short form merger in Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977),
pending a showing that it was "entirely fair to [the] minority stockholders," the chancellor stated that he was not bound by the supreme court's ruling in Stauffer. 318 A.2d at
245. Such an application of Singer's business purpose and entire fairness standards is
inconsistent with the legislative intent and works only to frustrate the recognized purpose of the short form merger statute.

